Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005

Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005
by Thomas E. Ricks
Penguin, 2007


Bob Woodward’s The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008, which Glenn reviewed earlier, examines the current “surge era” of the war in Iraq, beginning in 2006. In this book, Thomas Ricks offers a thoroughly sourced analysis of how we went to war in Iraq, how the war was conducted prior to the surge, and the consequences that the early phase of the war had for the US. As a bonus, it is also a gripping, fast-paced narrative.

In a nutshell, Ricks demonstrates that US decision-makers justified the war with Iraq by believing worst-case assumptions; indeed, in many cases they actively solicited those assumptions, and in some cases, they probably manufactured them. The chief villains he sees in this process are Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, and Dick Cheney. Wolfowitz, one of the many Department of Defense high-level officials who had no military experience at all, is the subject of Ricks' particular scorn.

After the decision to go to war was made, the mind set of our decision-makers changed; rather than believing worst-case scenarios, they believed best-case assumptions about how our forces would be received by the Iraqis and how the war would likely proceed. This led to what Ricks sees as the major blunder in US planning, the commitment of insufficient troops to the war. The chief villains are Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Tommy Franks, but the political generals in the Joint Chiefs of Staff are also culpable.

The lack of sufficient forces was exacerbated by a complete failure of vision on the part of the Army's leaders, namely their near amnesia about the lessons the US learned at great cost in Vietnam about fighting insurgencies.

Ricks does not see sinister conspiracies or imperialistic ambitions at the root of our Iraqi involvement; rather, he sees it literally as a fiasco. The book's subtitle is "The American Military Adventure in Iraq." He's using "adventure" in the sense of an ill-considered fling, and that sums up his view of how the war was prosecuted.

The only heroes in the book are the ground troops, most of whom have acted with great courage and honor to carry out the wishes of our political and military leaders—no matter how ill-considered or unrealistic—while they tried to stay alive in the steadily deteriorating conditions prior to the surge.

The book is based on hundreds of interviews Ricks conducted with current and former political, foreign policy, and military officials. The unique thing he does is to rely most heavily on the military "middle management"—the majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels—for the bulk of his interviews. These are the people who have the best vantage point for what happened at the intersection of policy and military operations early in the war.

This is an important, well-written book that will more than justify the time taken to read it.