Guests of the Ayatollah

Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in America's War with Militant Islam
by Mark Bowden

Grove Press, 2007, 704 pages.

What more could there be to say about a crisis that happened over a quarter century ago? As it turns out, there are some very important things to say about it, and Mark Bowden's masterful history of that crisis says them.

This is an absolutely first-rate “you are there” account of what the 52 American hostages went through during the 444 days they were captives as Iran descended into chaos and near madness after the ouster of the Shah. One can literally feel their anger, fear, and depression—and their pride when they can defy or denigrate their captors, even fleetingly. However, one can feel the smugness and religious certainty of their captors, too.

It is interesting to note—and important to remember—that while many of the hostages were experienced diplomats, and some were serious students of Persian history and culture, the young Iranian radicals were amateurs, most of whom had naïve, conspiratorial views of the world. The hostage-takers believed that the American embassy was literally a den of spies and each of the hostages a cleverly-disguised James Bond. Further, most of them knew almost nothing about history and even less about cultures other than their own. As a result, the hostage crisis was essentially inevitable.

The book is thought-provoking in ways I didn't expect. The ostensible trigger for the crisis was the decision by the US to admit the Shah to this country for treatment of the cancer that would eventually kill him. However, that decision was sold to President Carter by his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, who in turn was sold on it by Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller. As the years roll on, it's interesting how many disastrous US foreign policy decisions come back to Kissinger.

Further, the CIA was no better then at understanding and predicting events in the Islamic world than it is now. Shortly before the crisis erupted, the agency reported that the religious radicals would soon be relegated to the background there, so the US could deal with an emerging secular state with confidence. In reality, the country was degenerating into a hurricane of religious nuttiness that soon swept aside all of the secular leaders. Quite literally, no one at all was really in charge of anything in Iran, and that's the reason the crisis dragged on for over a year.

This brings us to the role of President Carter. Nearly everyone felt at the time that he was too weak and vacillating to resolve the crisis. Not so; he tirelessly attempted to find a way to deal with the situation, but every attempt failed when the connection at the Iranian end disintegrated. No one could have done much more, which is why presidential candidate Ronald Reagan continually criticized Carter, but never offered a specific word of explanation about what he would do.

The failed rescue attempt was blamed on Carter, too, but as Bowden makes clear, it had little chance of succeeding because the equipment available at the time was inadequate, and the situation was impossible. Even if Delta Force had made it to Tehran, it's likely that most or all of the hostages and rescuers would have died in the operation. Carter and the troops deserve credit for daring the attempt, even in the face of near-certain failure.

The crisis is still relevant because it explains why the Islamic Republic behaves so rashly and seemingly without strategic direction. In foreign affairs, the country is isolated; economically, the country is wretchedly managed; and in politics, the country's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has publicly embraced Holocaust denial. All of this raises the obvious question: “Why are they acting in such a seemingly self-destructive way?”

As Bowden explains, the answer may well be that the mind set of the hostage-takers still dominates political thought in Iran today. The embassy seizure was not a well-conceived strategic move; rather, it was a carelessly and rashly planned action designed to attract maximum public attention, demonstrate the hostage-takers’ anti-imperialist fervor, and drive a wedge between Tehran's moderates and radicals.

Now, three decades later, Iranian politics still works similarly, with apparently impromptu decision-making and abundant confusion. This really shouldn’t be a surprise; Ahmadinejad was one of the student radicals, though his specific role and importance is in dispute. A surprising number of prominent Iranian officials were also involved in the embassy seizure. They clearly still have much of the hard-line student radicals left in them.

This book is must reading as the authoritative account of the first battle in the war with the "Islamofascists." And it's well worth reading as a rich account of the courage that the hostages and their would-be rescuers displayed in very trying circumstances.