Commentaries on Commentary: “Realists to the Rescue?”
Bret Stephens’ article in the February 2007 issue of Commentary magazine is, first and foremost, an attack on the Iraq Study Group’s set of “79 prescriptions for U.S. policy in the Middle East.” To reveal Mr. Stephens’ attitude, I don’t think I can do better than to quote this long sentence from his first paragraph. (I think this is what we might call the “topic sentence” of his essay.)
“With neoconservatism supposedly repudiated by the ‘fiasco’ of Iraq, the backing of a wise man’s council composed equally of Republicans and Democrats, and a friendly media breeze in its sails, the ISG report was heralded not just as a fresh perspective on Iraq but as offering, at last, a new and blessedly different type of foreign policy for a country tired both of foreign adventures and of the adventurist President conducting them.” (Page 27)
Let us consider for a moment this sentence. Mr. Stephens is saying that Iraq is not a “fiasco,” though it has been characterized as such by many observers. He is also saying that, therefore, neoconservatism has not been repudiated. He implies that the media is a leading force in attacks on our “adventurist President” and his policies. And, moreover, he considers that the favorable reception of the ISG report was due in large part to the bipartisan nature of the effort. If, however, the ISG report isn’t as successful as it was first represented to be, perhaps bipartisanship isn’t a valuable approach.
I could characterize this in a near-parody of criticism of the Bush administration’s Iraq policy. Mr. Stephens seems – and the article makes clear that the seeming is real – to support the neoconservative enterprise which sponsored the war on and in Iraq, to support unilateralist and partisan political approaches, to place the media in the camp of the “enemy,” so that all media criticism of Mr. Bush can be attributed to partisan bias, and to feel that the war in Iraq has been to some degree successful. In other words, “We were right all along, and anyone who says we weren’t is against us for partisan political reasons.”
However, Mr. Stephens deserves better than that. He goes on to a review of the realist approach to international politics, from Hans Morgenthau, through Eisenhower and Nixon, to the present. He sees both failures and successes in that record, and his views may be summed up in this sentence: “Finally, realists have performed best when they have resisted the lure of their doctrine’s ingrained passivity, verging on defeatism.” In other words, realism is all right as long as it isn’t too realistic.
Mr. Stephens proposes five factors which are present in today’s “global affairs that challenge realism’s most basic premises.” These are:
The accelerated pace of democratization.
The reach and impact of the news media.
The intersection – one might say the blending – of humanitarian and strategic challenges.
The nature of post-9/11 terrorism.
The increasingly asymmetrical nature of global conflicts.
“The upshot,” says Mr. Stephens, “is that the United States faces a set of urgent challenges – and, to be sure, potentially fruitful opportunities – which realism never fully anticipated and to which realists have yet to adapt.” (Page 32).
This brings us back to the ISG and its weaknesses. Since the ISG is based on “bad” realist thinking, the sort of narrow, interest-based thinking that characterized the Eisenhower administration, it proposes that the U.S. hold the Iraqi administration to various standards, proposes diplomatic approaches to Syria and Iran, and ignores the perils of Hamas and Hizballah.
After saying that realism was, at its best, a call to common sense, he goes on:
“By contrast, today’s realists begin from theory and proceed to wishes: the wish that war against Islamist terror can be waged at the same relatively leisurely pace as the cold war, and perhaps need not be waged at all; the wish that one can negotiate in good faith and clear conscience with Iran and Syria; the wish that all will be resolved with the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict; the wish that one can curry favor with terrorists, and win them to our side, if only one offers the right mix of incentives; the wish that we can hold our allies’ feet to the fire, and not lose them.” (Page 34)
I would like to make four points.
First, Mr. Stephens is absolutely right that a realist approach (Thank you, Mr. Burke!) stressed prudence and a due regard to one’s limitations. Realists disliked exchanging a known, and controlled evil, for a new situation of unknown difficulty.
Second, a lot – only God knows how much – of Mr. Stephens’ critique of realism is due to the neoconservative attachment to Israel. Eisenhower’s realism was bad because it led him to stop the Suez adventure in 1956. Nixon’s realism was good because he support the Israelis in 1973. And, I suspect, the ISG is bad because it would call upon Israel to make concessions and to accept realities that are unpalatable to Israel.
Third, I think that none of Mr. Stephens’ five new factors are particularly new, nor do I think that a realist approach cannot account for them. After all, realist thinking was based on the run-up to World War I, in which terrorism, increasing democratization (from a much lower base), and asymmetrical relations all played a major part.
Fourth, I think Mr. Stephens’ gives his game away with one little phrase in the last statement quoted: “clear conscience.” Let us think about why one could not, with a clear conscience, open a discussion with any country about any subject.
Glenn A Knight
In my study
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8 comments:
Glenn, perhaps you could explain what is meant by 'realism'. I am confused because 'realism' is described in terms that I would attribute to 'idealism'. Things like it having a doctrine of passivity or beginning with theory and proceeding to wishes.
It seems to me that, to accurately call a political philosophy 'realistic', it must certainly have a set of basic values - otherwise there is no way to determine what ought to be done. Then, 'realism' would proceed accomplishing what portion of these goals could be achieved and not sweating the fact that 100% couldn't be accomplished. 'realism' would take trade off's seriously and would ask questions like: "Yes, we can get rid of Saddam Hussein and he is a nasty fellow, but would that really make the middle east better off?" or "Yes, getting into the war was an egregious error, but would withdrawing now make things better or worse?" That is how I would judge something as 'realistic'.
If this isn't what is meant in the article by 'realistic', I would appreciate an explanation. If it is, I would appreciate an explanation of what the base values are. After all, one could set out to conquer the world, get rich, spread democracy or get laid 'realistically'.
Realism, as used in political science, is a theory of international relations which is both descriptive and prescriptive. That is, realism contends that states - states are the actors in international relations in this theory - do act in accordance with their objective interests, and should act in accordance with their objective interests.
A number of criticisms of the Bush administration's war policy have been characterized as coming from the "realist" school, and not all of these critics would reject that characterization. Brent Scowcroft, for example, the retired general who was National Security Advisor under President George H. W. Bush, has been critical of the Iraq war because the goals were unrealistic, and the goals which could be achieved were not worth the cost.
In the article I was reviewing, Bret Stephens is being critical of the realist school for its inherent caution. That is, realists try to calculate the value to the nation of the goals to be achieved (by diplomacy, war, or other means), and the cost to the nation of achieving such a goal. Because such calculations tend to emphasize the risks in large enterprises - or, perhaps, because the people who make such calculations tend to focus on the risks, realist policies tend to avoid going out on limbs.
What's wrong with that? Even Stephens says that prudence is a good thing. The problem, from a neoconservative point of view, is that basic ideals and values tend to be compromised. The United States is a democratic nation; we believe in democracy; we think everyone should live in a democracy. However, because it would be costly to try to convert other countries into democracies, and because the outcome would be uncertain, realists are unlikely to support the idea of making war, or even using a lot of diplomatic capital, in order to promote democracy.
Stephens is saying, in effect, that the Iraq Study Group's attempt to provide a realist analysis of a course of action in the Middle East is flawed, because it doesn't take into account either the ideals of American political culture, or the moral standing (or lack thereof) of some of the proposed interlocutors. The ISG recommends diplomatic conversations with Iraq and Syria. Stephens, and many others, oppose even talking with these countries because they are "evil." In the realist framework, moral terms, such as good and evil, have no meaning in international relations. Good is what promotes the interests of the United States.
In that sense, realist political philosophy is like classical economics, which contends that the best overall outcome is obtained when each actor behaves in accordance with his interests, as he perceives them.
Finally, there are two real questions about realist analysis. First, are there really objective interests? Aren't our interests simply expressions of our values and ideals, just as other countries' interests stem from their values? In that case, if the American people really value democracy, and would like to live in a world of democracies, isn't it in our interest to promote that? Second, there is the question of scope, or timeframe. Mr. Bush contends that a policy of neglect of the Middle East is unrealistic, because, in the end, it will promote anti-American terrorism, and increase the degree of threat in the world. While turning the Muslim countries into democracies may be hard and expensive, and may cost us in terms of other interests, it may be worth doing, if we end up in a safer world.
I am going to comment further on one particular point in Mr. Bret Stephens' article. Mr. Stephens says: “By contrast, today’s realists begin from theory and proceed to wishes: the wish that war against Islamist terror can be waged at the same relatively leisurely pace as the cold war, and perhaps need not be waged at all[.]"
Mr. Stephens says this as if it were self-evident not only that the war against Islamist terror must be waged, but that it cannot be waged at the same "leisurely" pace as the Cold War. I don't think that it is self-evident that the Cold War is a bad model for our war on Islamist terrorism.
First, in the 45 years of the Cold War (1945-1990), there were a number of quite dramatic, and sometimes violent, events. There was a war in Korea from 1950 until 1953, which is still in a state of truce. There was a war in Vietnam from 1954 until 1975. There were revolts in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. There was a Communist takeover of Cuba, and Yugoslavia and China broke with the Soviet Union. There was military action, subversion, and violence in the Congo, Iran, Guatemala, and Indonesia, to name a few places.
"Leisurely?" I don't think so.
Second, the current conflict, like the Cold War, is first and foremost a conflict of ideologies. Ideologies are learned, and they are, once learned, hard to change. We used various methods of propaganda in the Cold War to promote our point of view, and we opposed Communist propaganda by a variety of means.
In the case of Islam, we need to develop effective propaganda and education methods suitable to a number of countries, half-a-dozen languages, and over one billion people from Morocco to Indonesia.
Third, one component of the Cold War was what we now call homeland security: defensive measures against subversion, espionage, and military attacks on our core areas. It took time to develop measures that were both effective and consistent with the degree of threat, while preserving our individual freedoms. Similarly, we need to work on assimilating Islamic immigrants, and, particularly, helping our friends in Europe to assimilate their Muslim populations.
If we are able to claim, by 2046, that we have definitively defeated Islamist terrorism, I for one will think we've accomplished quite a lot.
Glenn:
I have been idly threatening to respond to posts for a couple weeks now but I’ve been pretty busy. My bosses were in from the States and I have been flying back and forth from Hyderabad to the Bay of Bengal the last two weekends. My company is moving operations to a city called Vizag, or, more traditionally, Vishakhapatnam, and so I've had little time to interact with you guys.
Thanks for posting this. I sympathize with Sean’s comment. I spent a fair amount of time going through the article trying to get a good definition of “realist”. I understand that in context the term does not simply refer to someone being “realistic” by a layman’s standards but rather refers to a label ascribed to a certain specific school of diplomatic thought. I gave up after a while. The best I could find was:
“At his best, then, the intelligent realist believes that while power—and not international law or morality—remains the coin of the realm in international relations, one must entertain modest expectations for what power alone can achieve.”
One thing about labels such as “realist”: not all democrats are Democrats and not all realists are Realists. I imagine I would be labeled as a "neo-conservative" even though I’ve never been a leftist (that is, there is nothing "neo" about my conservatism) and I certainly consider myself a realist though I doubt I agree with the suggested policies of the current “realist” school.
Again, thanks for doing the work of getting these posts going.
Regards,
Zabeli
Agim,
I didn't think the term neo-conservative referred to a time frame, but rather a "new" conservatism that differs from the older brand. It is my colloquial understanding that neo-conservatives and traditional conservatives sees things differently on things like government size, foreign policy, and education; but have common ground on abortion, morals, etc.
Perhaps I am a unique soul in the world when it comes to political, social, and moral beliefs. I always figured myself as more of traditional conservative, if I was forced to pick a label.
Doug:
I think you're right about the difference between what are considered, for lack of a better term, "standard" views of neo-conservatives and, say, traditional social conservatives. I only meant that I understand the term 'neo-conservative' to mean someone that was once a liberal and then later changed his views but still brought some of the liberal worldview to his now conservative position.
I too have trouble with labels. Some of my views would be considered socially conservative while others would be socially liberal; some would be classically liberal (and therefore now - as often as not - radically conservative, e.g., the right to bear arms).
It seems to me labels are, and usually have been, mostly used as an excuse to simply dismiss the views of one's opponent in an argument, and they do little to advance real discourse.
Rgds,
Zabeli
In the world of current political parlance, the neo-conservatives are, as Agim says, people - like Norman Podhoretz and Seymour Martin Lipset, who were once liberals, but have become conservatives. This doesn't mean that their views are different from other conservatives, but, because of their origins, they tend to focus on the issues that led to their conversions. Moreover, there are many people who were never liberals, but who have come to agree with the neoconservatives.
Actually, "liberal" may not be the right word here. Like an older generation of Communists turned anti-Communist (Daniel Burnham, for example), many of the neocons were Trotskyites, that is to say, extreme left-wingers who turned against Communism because of 1) Stalin's crimes, 2) the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, 3) or the Soviet attitude toward Israel and the Jewish people.
When people convert from an extreme position, they tend not to settle down in the middle. Rather, they tend to go to the other extreme. The neocons tend to see leftist positions as not merely wrong, but evil, and they tend to identify any kind of left-wing or liberal thinking with the kind of extreme Trotskyite thinking they grew up with in the Young People's Socialist League.
Glenn:
Thanks for the response. You write: "The neocons tend to see leftist positions as not merely wrong, but evil(.)"
I have to assume we are talking about “policy positions”. If so, I’m not sure there is much difference between how ‘neocons’ view the position of political opponents, and how other normal people do. I don’t know how we should separate the evil or the good of a policy from the policy’s implications. I mean, if I think a policy will have evil consequences, wouldn’t I consider the policy itself evil? A reasonable definition of “policy” is: “a plan or a course of action” (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/policy).
A “policy” then is a plan, or a course of action, that will lead to a specific result. A “position” supporting that policy would be support for a plan, or a course of action, that will lead to a specific result. To hold, then, that a position is evil if we believe the policy supported by that position will lead to evil, doesn’t strike me as particular to one single group of thinkers. Basically, I believe most people think that way.
Because I've already mentioned it, I'll use gun rights as an example (though I have no idea if there is an ‘official’ neocon position on gun rights): I believe a disarmed citizenry is unacceptably vulnerable to the predations of both tyrannical government and evil private men. I further believe that what some people are vulnerable to, other people will exploit. If allowed, governments will tend to act more tyrannical, and evil private men will act more boldly in the commission of their crimes. I don't think most people that call for the elimination of private arms are evil. Nor do I believe the policy is always, or even usually, meant to be evil. I do however believe such policies if enacted would lead to evil. I would therefore say such policies are evil.
If a policy is evil, what am I to think of a “position” that supports the evil policy? Either the “position” on the policy is based on a hope the policy will indeed lead to consequences I consider evil (in which case I have no trouble calling the position “evil”) or the position is based on the hope the policy will lead to something other than what the policy will lead to (in which case I might call the “position” misguided, wrong, etc., but I would still happily refer to the “policy” as evil).
Again, is there anything that makes this different from the way others see political positions?
Regards,
Zabeli
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